This paper is carried on in the current political institutional debate in Europe, starting from '90, concerning both local development incentives and promotion of innovative enterprises from bottom up. Among many policies in this strand, we focus on the welfare reform in Italy, essentially based on the decentralization principle intended not merely as a competencies delegation, but as a power devolution process, to local agencies and social communities. This new approach on welfare policy seem to be relevant for social inclusion, by increasing the opportunity-set of employment, promoting local partnership and sustaining a fair cooperation. We interpret the local welfare restructuring design in Italy (L.328/00) that represent the natural conclusion of a path towards policy decentralization, began with L.833/78 and L.287/97, in particularly we will tray to put in evidence the novelty of the law and its principal issues.
Introduction
The main concern of this paper is the recent reform of the welfare State in Italy, in the specific field of the social-health policies that was promoted by the previous centre-left government, introduced by the "Frame rule for the implementation of the integrated system of interventions and social services" (L.328/2000) , and actually perceived and implemented by many sub-national authorities (such as regions, provinces, municipalities, and aggregation of municipalities named by the law "Piani di zona), and Third sector organisations involved in the changed political environment of a centre-right government.
Therefore, the effective process of implementation of this reform, and their multiple expected welfare issues, will be depend both on the emergence of new and likely conflicting public policy strategies at macroeconomic level, as well as on the different adaptation feasibility and adversion-to-change, expressed in fact by all interested parties to this welfare reform, at local level.
According to that aim, it seems to be relevant to investigate if and how intensive the real degrees of success of L.328/00 will be different across subnational areas or, in other words, if and how intensive pre-existing welfare differentials among regions will be persist or, on the contrary, cleared.. Given the normative formal characteristics of the L.328/00 -named "frame rule" -it is suggested, that one of the relevant theoretical question, underpinning in our explanation of both the normative formal design and of the territorial and socioeconomic interdependences, is whether and where "path dependence" rather than "optimistic expectations" are the driving force in the adoption process of the L.328/00 by all the agents and organizations involved. (see Krugman,1996 ; for an initial application of these ideas to welfare case see Garofalo and Supino, 2002 ).
The paper is structured as follows: § 2 debates the methodological premises and general theoretical questions that guide our investigation on the process of welfare reform both at territorial and social level in Italy; § 3 makes clear why a peculiar new-institutional ermeneutics ( Aoki, 2001; North, 1991; Ray, 1998; Dixit, 1996; Garofalo and Supino, 2002 , among many others) seems to be useful to explain the internal normative design of L.328/00 and its external implementations, by emphasising the various links of normatively prescribed interdependences; §4 analyzes principal stylized fact to relate by the law § 5 provides a critical analysis by the law, 6 § suggests same political -economic questions linked to this preliminary phase of in -itinere impact evaluation of the social policies reform in Italy and opens the way to a future investigation about the reached efficacy of this reform in same selected areas of "Piani di zona".
The Methodological premises
With respect to this theme, there are many plausible methodological approaches, that could be followed in order to study and evaluate any specific normative design and its impact and relevance on the correspondent economic context, like as, in our case, that legislative framework relative to the current reform of welfare state in Italy.
These approaches could be, essentially, summarized in the following way: (i) an applied analysis that considers, previously, the normative framework as a given and static background and, therefore, investigates the connected impacts realized both in the territorial and social areas and, finally, compares the effective observed outcomes with the expected objectives. (ii) A comparative analysis about different political criteria suggesting public policies and reform projects of welfare state, that are, currently, thought and implemented cross-countries, even in order to build or rise more general patterns of welfare state. (iii) An economic analysis of the normative framework, that will be not considered like as an behavioural exogenous constraint, but in terms of a comprehensive set of rules, that are formally designed to provide additional opportunities and incentives for the choices of individuals, groups and organizations by enabling, these agents to carry out new interactions and, eventually, to "exploit" gains just from their interdependences.
For our theoretical aim, one of the suggestion derived from the latter approach is to overcome the standard positivistic view, such that a given legislative design represents the sufficient condition to induce a unique set of choices from agents, and, therefore, to determine a unique path of events and outcomes, strictly linked to the normative rules and prescriptions (Cooter and al., 1998; Dixit, 2001 ).
On the contrary, it should be intended, merely, as a necessary condition in order to promote and select more and innovative (economic, social, political) choices -ofand transactions among private, social and institutional agents. During the effective process of implementation of this law, it is the historical bundle of human/ institutional reactions that plays not deterministic and complementary role of the sufficient conditions to achieve the expected efficacy of any formally written law and selected policy strategies. Or, in political-economic terms, it is assumed that new law or policy matter in that it plays the exogenous "big push" to an economy (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943 , and more recently Adserà and Ray, 2000, Ray 1998 ).
For our descriptive aim, it suggests to take into account the social impacts linked to any normative rule, institutional decision and strategy of policy (Cooter and al., 1998, p.12) : it means, firstly, to describe the social welfare function supposed to be maximized by means of a law or policy strategy and, further, to evaluate which is its social appropriateness -both expected and achieved -in terms of its direct and indirect targets, and its linked costs and benefits.
According to these three methodological alternatives, our preference is in favour to point (iii): it seems to be, namely, more adequate, than the others two, to our theoretical aim, i.e. to decode the L.328/00, that is formally designed as a "frame rule" or "soft law", built as a set of formal even if incomplete rules and enforcement mechanisms. It means that its effective prescribed content, and therefore its historical efficacy, will depend on how both the involved, private and social, agents and the public organizations perceive these rules and, subsequently, complete them with their "flexible" and "dynamic" decisions ( Dixit, 1996) , at sub-national levels. In other words, it means that the compulsory content of this frame rule could vary, in the real process of its implementation, just according to the microeconomic utility functions -that are, in fact, many and differentiated -on one hand, and to the derived effects observable in the ways of macroeconomic performances -that are, by hypothesis, multiple -, on the other .
Within this methodological view, we can select many general questions as key-guide of our explanation both of the political address and normative structure of the L.328/00: (iv) which is the underlying pattern of solidarity and of social cohesion that is preferred? Is it more oriented to an universalistic system of protection of its citizens (such as the Beveridge approach to welfare state), or rather is it in favour of selective system by previously targeting groups of workers or citizens (such as the Bismark approach)? And, against which kind of risk, by which measures, how long the protection, and so on? (Ferrera,1998; Esping-Andersen, 1998; Boeri and Redi, 1997) . (v) Which are the key-criteria of the current welfare state design? Does prevailing that of an economic efficiency in terms of costs reduction, rather than one of social equity in terms of benefits redistribution? Is it observable even in a movement towards a more active approach of protection (e.g. work-to-fare) instead of that passive like as in Nordic Countries ( for a cross-countries comparison see what's about a complementarity between the social policy and other relevant public policies for social inclusion, such as that for local development and employment?
Obviously many other questions we could put in an investigation on the current welfare state reform, but for our aim that seem enough! Even these three questions could be referred, in some sense, to overlapping themes, strong preference is for point (vi).In short, the points (iii) and (vi) help us, namely, to clarify and narrow the theme chosen of our hermeneutics. They refer, namely, to the explanation of policy welfare reform as formalized through the normative framework of L.328/00 that we interpret as an "institutional device", i.e. as a set of formal and incomplete rules and of those complementary rules (North,1991; Aoki, 2001 ) governing all the actions promoted by the law and, therefore, activated by many sub-national authorities, organisations of third sector and social private agents, as this law asks for.
The first theme concern a re-definition of the role of the State with respect to peripheral local levels of decisions (Bailey, 1999) , within this specific normative design that is oriented to decentralisation of competences and of decision on the one hand, and according to the reform the Fifth Titles of Constitution (l.267/00) on the other. The crucial political-institutional problem consists in an equilibrium between a growing regional autonomy and the guarantee of uniform levels of essential social services across regions (art. 117 of the Italian Constitution; art. 2 L.328/00): the so called Social Regional Plan (PSR) is, namely, the programmatic tool of public policies in the field of welfare. This problem refers to the promotion of networks able to balance autonomy and equity, and that will take place through a spreading organisation of supply of social services from the non profit organizations (ONP)
The second theme -strictly linked to the first -is concerning the operational meaning of decentralisation: in the Italian case it refers, simultaneously, to a double notion of subsidiarity. One is the territorial or vertical subsidiarity, such that the transaction costs could be minimized, because political decision-making and competences of services supply are attributed according to the criterion of proximity to personal/social needs. The other is the social or horizontal subsidiarity, such that the benefits of cooperation and coordination could be maximized, because many local supply units (such as various types of non profit organisations and private agents) are not only promoted and sustained, but also requested to integrate their individual supply decisions in terms of sector, quality and size of provision (art. 3 L.328/00). In a broader sense, the latter notion of subsidiarity can be intended as an innovative institutional rule not only on the supply-side, but essentially on the demand side in that it is able to stimulate from bottom up perceptions of differentiated needs (i.e. traditional advocacy function) and, by this way, to sustain and regulate genesis and performance of a social market at local level.
To summarize: our main concern is to decode the normative design of the L.328/00, by emphasizing those forms of interdependences, and in particular those relative to the political-institutional level rather than economic, explicitly introduced by the law. Through the not-always-linear evolution of the preliminary political debate, and of even sectorial legislative innovation in the social services field, it will be clarified subject, rules and roles of the current welfare state reform in Italy and its initial impacts on regionally differentiated socio-economic contexts. 
Our Theoretical categories
The theoretical categories of "exit" and "voice" (Hirschman,1974) seem to be well suited to explain the design of welfare state reform, and they guide its implementation at local level. "Exit" could be consistent with a decentralisation of competences and privatization of social services supply. It is promoted, essentially, from the central authorities because on the basis of the principal economic aims that is to increase competition among producers and municipalities, and by this ways to enlarge the opportunity set on the demand side. The institutional mechanism of "exit" would perform like as an efficient market, because consumers have been provided by vouchers ( art. 17 L.328/00) in order to purchase freely social services, whether the producers will resist on the social market or exit. "Voice" is the alternative institutional device, that is shaped from bottom -up and perhaps by a spontaneous process, in order to reveal local needs and segmented preferences that are not enough satisfied by the current standard supply. If (and how) "voice" is, in the reality, a formally recognized and powerful tool of interests' representation in the political context, it'll depends on the normative design that specify institutional and organizational interdependences. If (and how) "voice" is able to improve economic efficiency, it'll depends on the (pre-existing) informal networks prone to coordination and cooperation of production choices. Whether the impersonal tool of "exit" is costless , the personal tool of "voice" must pay political transaction costs for lobbying and bargaining process of goals and resources allocation. The above questions are not trivial, because of the dual and simultaneous functions that the third sector plays. It is, namely, a private agent, that is structured on the basis of its social identification on one hand, and it has a public role by providing public goods and social services, and contributing to produce, in this ways, the effective notion of solidarity and, therefore, strategies in favour of social cohesion. This governance model is named of "output legitimacy" (Sharpf, 1997) . In short, those interdependences -that are formally designed by law, among different sector of welfare state -concerning not only financial and contractual relations in terms of network resources dependence: they are regarding, essentially, the institutional linkages that are crucial for the performance of welfare mix ( art 11 on the authorization to operate and quality control of non profit organizations) (Ranci,1998) .
Before to investigate in depth the internal structure of the L.328/00 ( § § 4 and 5), the are two additional fundamental questions to put in the future debate, that are relative the initial steps of a policy reform and a normative design. That is in order to evaluate if a path-dependence process dominates these steps, it'll generate, therefore, inertial choices in the policy making process. In this case the costs of political change would be greater than expected benefits. Or alternatively, if the political propension to innovate are strong enough, it'll induce and sustain a "migration" process from the old to a new welfare regime ( Garofalo and Supino, 2002) . ,what peculiar points they have for assuring the effectiveness of these politics.
Such an approach tries to combine the three perspectives mentioned above.
underlining that the evolution of the law or the politics is conditioned to external environment. Besides it is, at the same time, the result of its "policy actors' ideas and preferences that try to overcome in an efficient way, through new tools, the Insofar, the reading of the law 328/00 will be done trying to individualize a link between the political process and the inside organization of welfare, given the contextual and institutional pressures. We will endeavour to explore the causes of the passage from a model of occupational coverage type to a model inspired by the principles of social citizens. In the rest of the section we will try to give an answer to the following questions: ii)What has activated the political process that brought about the frame rule ?; ii) What has determined the affirmation of universalistic model of coverage, and in particularly a soft coverage model?.
The Outside environment, the institutional context and the political area
The law 328/00 can be defined as an important "step" in the long process of redesigning social politics and of redesigning some welfare system plan in Italy. We speak of "steps" and not of a final destination as far as the law is concerned, as it seems more correct to attribute to interventions in welfare politics an evolutionary character, which is moreover more coherent in comparison to the notion of social risk 3 . The first question is: which are the strengths that have inspired the political 3 The concept of social risk, in comparison to the concept of need, allows to interpret in reality the complexity of the society, but such concept also complicates the role of the politics that has called to find solutions or models of coverage toward to emerge of risks with non void probability. Such concept summons an ability of problem solving that it is always not verifiable in the political process. The process of policy making has a very deep limit individualized in a stillness of the decisions resulted of a path dependence that conditions the political process. The change of a political rule, following exogenous shock that changes the conditions of the game, it is a very expensive process in terms of high costs of investment that the policy maker has to sustain for migrating from a bad equilibrium toward a good equilibrium. These costs of investment concern both costs in terms of loss of consent to abandon rules that favoured particular groups of interest both costs that they depend on the political competition. (Esping-Andersen,1999) reform process ? The political process that has brought to the law reforms originated from a crisis of public politics that made specific demands of institutional readjustment emerge and solicited many social, economic and political actors to question the various aims that a reform could follow. (Ferrera 1993) . In the Italian case two strengths have acted on the crisis of public politics: one inside and the other outside. The "inside" strength upset the old equilibrium on which the system of welfare was founded , more specifically, the reduction of the rates of growth together with a demographic imbalance. It upset the financial viability of the social state . The financial endurability of the social state has become even more acute in the face of a high probability of emerging social risks, but a low degree of correlation among Insofar, the principle of universality declared in the law (art 1 and art 2) represents the answer to these two strengths. The "inside" one, that has put in evidence a different social context in which the approach of category was not more suitable and the external one that has affirmed a new concept of citizenship.
The law 328/00, in its general principles, is coherent to the specific contents of the approach (art.6, art.7, art.8, art.9, on the vertical subsidiarity) , iv) the attempt to introduce a clear regulation of the relationships between Public Administration and ONP, extending toward the constitution of a "controlled market" (art.11, art.12, art.
13, art.17).
The key of reading of "institutional appropriateness" (March and Olsen 1991) focuses the attention on the fact that both political and economic actors are conditioned from the inheritances of the past, when they think about new solutions in front of changes of the economic and social environment, exposing them to the dynamics of an organizational inactivity, that produce incremental rules. As a result it allows us to interpret in more critical way these points of the law that have been excited for the strong innovative position. In the contest of social policies the State had done greater appeal to the third sector, even though in way not controlled: that is with the purpose to assure a level of social services compatible with its budget constrains. Such informal process has given political weight to the third sector organizations, allowing them to make action of lobby on the process of policy making in the fields of social politics (voice) (Lagerlof,1997) . Therefore, the principle of subsidiarity, both vertical and horizontal, can be read as an adaptive answer, like incremental, of political process to the institutional environment that had, already pursued in confused way, both the road of the decentralization and that of the inclusion from bottom-up. Therefore, such point of view decrease the innovative strengths by the law: in the new institutional perspective it represents only an answer more structured to old problems, rather than a really break even point with respect to policies legacy.
The principle of vertical subsidiarity, assigns to intermediary bodies (Regions and
Finally the political logic can help us to understand the complex legislative iter, that has characterized the process of Italian welfare reform. This logic has contributed, on the one hand, to the "syndrome of the inconsistency", and it has embitter rigidity and vicious circles that are translated in a legislative process and that has lasted for about ten years between proposals of law and reforms of sector, from the other side.
The approved text of the law results the synthesis of well fifteen projects of law and a design of law of the Prodi Government. The long live legislative production for the social politics, allows to support the idea that exists a narrow connection between the games of power and those of the solidarity (Ferrera,1998) . In the Italian case, we can affirm, that the walk toward the Frame Rule, and particularly, the affirmation of a universalistic approach in substitution of an selective target approach based on membership can also be read in a political optics, i.e as the result of a slow deterioration of politics of class, replaced in the first time by the politics of the categories and from the politics of the citizenship before. Two political elements have influenced this passage: the action of the groups of interests and the transformation of the electoral competition.
The first political element regard the genesis of groups of interests that is the direct consequence of the politics of the categories, which favours the birth of groups of pressure that they are activated for making lobby on the government (Ferrera,1998) . Insofar, the long iter of approval of the law 328/00 allows us to give an explanation to the accumulated delays, despite the urgent need of a legislative rationalization in the sector of social services. Finally, the competition for electoral consent has determined the choice of a legislative tool, designed as Frame Rule, that seems proper to reconcile the political logics even if it seems less efficient to pursue the goals of welfare reform. The tool of the Frame Rule is consistent, namely, with the need of the policy -maker to effect a political choice that keeps in mind the imperative of the financial sustainability, on the one hand, and the maintenance of consent on the other hand. In this sense the Frame Rule dictates general principles submitting to following laws for the real application. Such strategy allows to provide incentives of sharing to all actors in the political game, and allow to reconcile institutional politics and contextual logic, but the really problem remains the effectiveness of the law.
Regarding the political perspective that has allowed us to give a key of reading of the long process that has countersigned the law 328/00, is interesting to notice that the facts of the last time, i.e the emanation of the White Book on the welfare (February) 2003). The principles declared in the White Book overcome and enter in contradiction with the law 328/00.
5. The syndrome of inconsistency.
The theoretical inconsistency
The analysis of the Welfare Reform in Italy (L.328/00) suggest us important to bring the attention on that we have defined "syndrome of the inconsistency". The aim of this section is, namely, to point on three great law's issues: i) normative inconsistency, ii) financial inconsistency and iii) contextual inconsistency, that they could compromise the really effectiveness of the law since the phase of its normative building. The first inconsistency is technically linked at the same norm, because the law provides that to effect all interventions include in its and to give concreteness to all principles enacted, had to resort, then, to a whole series of legislative acts (National Social Plan for the definition of least levels of assistance, Regional Plan, Plan of Zone), which puts again the process of formation of a politics with all problems of institutional ineffectiveness and of temporal incoherence of which it suffers. (Hemerijck,2002 , Dixit,1996 .
The second inconsistency is of financial nature, because the law declares to apply a principle of universality as it regards the social services making it however subordinate to the available resources (art.22, art 18). The law affirms to reform the system of social services and to improve the supply of social services ( In synthesis, the declaration of a principle of universality, intended as the recognition of a subjective right to enjoy of social services, suffers from a problem of maintenance of a binding commitment for three main reasons: i) the rule puts again its effectiveness to following political actions, ii) the law doesn't provide a punctual definition of a budget for effecting the interventions, iii) the law doesn't keep in mind of the territorial specificities. Particularly, the missed financial commitment is the element that more compromise the effectiveness of the law. As, to connect the realization of absolute right to the social services to the limit represented by the available financial and property resources, it means implicitly to declare an relative due to the right, it enters in contradiction with the right' absolute certainty.
In such case the rule -as it has been emanated by the legislator -shows a internal contradiction that induces the agents to hold that the commitments declared by the policy -makers are not credible. Such climate of uncertainty is not only fed by missed financial planning, but also from absence in the law of forecasts about the tools to guarantee the supply of essential levels of social services at local level (in fact are not provided mechanisms of sanction that makes really due such performances from the citizens).
This point of view brings us to the conclusion that the Welfare Reform in Italy (L.328/00), announced as a chance of the rules of the institutional game, represent exclusively an answer of "institutional appropriateness " or better, it represent, ,essentially, an instrumental and incremental change, rather than one "break even point" with respect to the external and internal changed. In the language of new institutional economics, this result can be translated with that is defined "lock-in effects" (North,1990) , the policy makers called to give an political answer about pushes of change, react by proposing "placebo" rules, or rather giving the impression to effect a care, which, however, it doesn't alter the pre-existing political equilibrium.
It is important to notice that such political strategy is not to zero cost, because it alters the process of formation of the expectations that are the base to create "shared beliefs" (Aoki,2001 ) that induces the agents to internalize a rule. This process is the necessary condition to assure the relative one the effectiveness of the rule. The scarce credibility of political rule has the effect to slow down the "process of migration" of key actors of a politics from a bad equilibrium toward a good equilibrium. (Ray and Adesera,1998).
In our specific case the key actors are: i) the families, ii)the organizations of third sector, iii) the local corporate body (Region, Commons).The law ask them, implicitly, to assume cooperative behaviours (named "concertazione")., to give concreteness to the law and to favourite its effectiveness. At same time policy-making doesn't furnish the sufficient incentives, so that, such actors are prone to undertake investments that typically modify the behaviour from an optics self-interest behaviours toward a fair 
A particular case: The Plan of Zone
The financial inconsistency of the law and therefore its poor applicability is also derived from the tools of planning used. Particularly, the Plan of Zone (art.19) represents an institutional innovation (Garofalo and Supino 2002), even if its effective application is bounded by the narrowness of available resources. In fact, the objective of creation of a welfare communities, through the Plan of Zone, are however incomplete on the side of economic resources, because it doesn't consider the economic regional differential peculiar of Italian economic system. Besides, the tool of the Plan of Zone, through the increase of the share of different subjects that involved in the phase of planning at local level favours genesis of interests groups and widespread the degrees of freedom of the actors during the interim stage making, still, less binding the rules emanated by the policy maker in the phase ex ante (Dixit,2001) . Finally since the responsibility of application of the integrated system of social services is submitted to only ability of the Local Corporate Body to plan the system with an incremental and flexible optics, this imply the risk that could be develop perverse dynamics of search of social consent. Insofar it is opportune to underline that the simple emanation of the rule that promotes the creation of the local partnerships (art.19), it is not by itself a sufficient condition to install a regulated and sustainable development, to produce the social cohesion and to promote the equal opportunities. Basically is necessary that the rule furnishes the incentives and provides sanctions so that the Communes involved in the application of the law are ready to build a politics for community that allows the creation of bonds and relationships, promotes processes of collective identification. The key -problem consist in the fact that the common corporate body to pursue such objective should not have the problem to reconcile the realization of the integrated service with the constrains of budget. The scarcity of resources implies a process of choice or better bargaining among different options. The formation of the preference about the best possible choice -given -the budget constrains is not unconditional from the external political environment (groups of interest, lobby). Therefore at the end such mechanism doesn't guarantee that the effected choice will be at the same time optimal from a social point of view. 
